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BANKRUPTCY
Joseph E. Conley, Jr.*
JURISDICTION
All developments in the bankruptcy field this year were over-
shadowed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,1 declaring unconstitutional the
broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.2 The decision at least temporarily creates great
uncertainty in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act and for the
long run creates considerable doubt about the ability of Congress to
establish a unitary system for the administration of bankrupt estates
and the development of bankruptcy law.
The Northern Pipeline decision arose from the reorganization of
Northern Pipeline under Chapter 11 of the Act.' After its petition
for reorganization was filed, Northern Pipeline filed in the bankrupt-
cy court a complaint against Marathon Pipeline alleging breaches of
contract and warranty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress." The
power of a bankruptcy court to hear a claim based on state law be-
tween a bankrupt and another party derives from section 241 of the
Bankruptcy Act.' It provides:
(b) ... the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or aris-
ing in or related to cases under Title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under
Title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction con-
ferred by this section on the district courts.
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
2. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of 11 & 28 U.S.C.).
3. 11 U.S.C. SS 1101-1174 (Supp. II 1978). Unlike the old Bankruptcy Act, which
contained several different forms of reorganization for different types of debtors, see
D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 279 (West 1980), the new Act contains
one unified chapter for all reorganizations, chapter 11. It is available to nearly all
debtors except stockbrokers and commodity brokers.
4. 102 S. Ct. at 2858 & 2864. Under the Act, a debtor in a reorganization pro-
ceeding remains in possession of its business until ousted by the appointment of an
independent trustee. 11 U.S.C. S 1104. This action was initiated by Northern Pipeline
as plaintiff as though no bankruptcy had occurred.
5. Codified as amendments to title 28 of the U.S. Code, 28 U.S.C. S 1471 (Supp.
11 1978).
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Since the claim of Northern Pipeline was "related to" a case under
Title 11, it was within this jurisdictional grant.6
This broad grant of power to bankruptcy judges was the basis
of Marathon's motion to dismiss Northern's complaint on the ground
that the statute conferred article III judicial power, that is, power
to hear a case arising under a federal statute, on judges who were
not given article III protection, i.e., life tenure and protection from
diminution of salary while in office.7 Bankruptcy judges do not have
these article III protections under the 1978 Act. They are appointed
only for fourteen-year terms, they can be removed from office,8 and
their salary can be adjusted according to provisions of the Federal
Salary Act of 1967.2 In addition, during an interim transitional period
the bankruptcy judges would serve only until March 31, 1984.0
Marathon's objection to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction was
based on the premise that if its rights were to be determined by a
federal judge, it should be a judge with the protection envisioned by
article III of the Constitution.1" This was not an objection unanticipated
by the drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, the House of
Representatives considered possible objections to limited-tenure
bankruptcy judges and determined to obviate the objections by mak-
ing all such judges "article III judges," i.e., insulated by the article
6. The leading treatise on the Bankruptcy Act interprets this language as re-
quiring some "nexus" between the asserted claim and the bankruptcy case, such as
"whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect upon the
estate being administered." 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.01[1][e], at 3-46 (L. King 15th
ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. It is difficult to imagine an action between a
debtor and a third party which would not satisfy this standard, either by augmenting
the estate or qualifying the third party to participate in the ultimate distribution of
assets or in the reorganization plan.
7. Article III of the United States Constitution gives to the federal government
judicial power over all cases "arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the
United States" and provides that this power shall be exercised by the Supreme Court
"and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." The judges of these inferior courts were to be insulated from political
pressure by life tenure and a guarantee that their salaries could not be diminished
while they served.
8. 28 U.S.C. S 153. Causes for removal include incompetence, misconduct, neglect
of duty, and physical or mental inability. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 154. The Federal Salary Act appears at 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1976).
It creates a federal commission for the review of salaries of federal employees, in-
cluding judges. Although probably intended to make recommendations for salary in-
creases, there appears to be nothing in the Act which prohibits a recommended decrease
in such salaries. In addition, the salary of bankruptcy judges are also adjustable under
28 U.S.C. § 461(b), which expressly contemplates a decrease in compensation.
10. 28 U.S.C. prec. § 151 (Supp. 11 1978).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2864.
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III protections.' A simultaneously passed Senate bill" did not take
this approach, and the Senate position prevailed in the conference
report and was approved by both houses." The Senate approach to
this problem was to vest all bankruptcy jurisdiction in district courts
and then through the district courts to the bankruptcy courts. 5 This
cumbersome approach, rather than a direct delegation of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts, was designed expressly to allay Congress'
perception of "substantial constitutional problems [which] surrounded
the grant of expanded jurisdiction to the non-tenured bankruptcy
court. . ". ."  In addition, in creating bankruptcy courts, Congress
declared them "an adjunct of the district court," 7 again in an effort
to avoid the constitutional problem.'8
Against this background, the issue came before the Supreme Court
in the Northern Pipeline case. There were two arguments advanced by
Northern Pipeline 9 in support of the bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
First, since Congress has the power to create substantive law relating
to bankruptcy under article I of the Constitution, ° it has the power
under article I to determine how such rights and liabilities shall be
determined, i.e., to create what have become known as "article I" or
"legislative courts."2 Second, Northern Pipeline argued that the
dispute was heard by an article III court, since the bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion was vested in the district courts and the bankruptcy courts merely
operated as adjuncts of these courts. Both of these arguments raised
questions which the Court had addressed in earlier opinions, but for
various reasons it had either been unable to assemble clear majorities
to clarify doctrine or had not defined the limits of congressional power
to make exceptions to article III.
The plurality opinion" first addressed the question of whether
bankruptcy courts could survive as article I, or legislative, courts and
attempted to limit this article III exception to three narrow areas.
12. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123, 124 Cong. Rec. 1804 (1978), discussed
in 1 COLLIER, supra note 6, § 3.01[2][b], at 3-59 to 3-62.
13. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123, 124 Cong. Rec. 28284 (1978).
14. The conference report was approved as an amended version of H.R. 8200. 1
COLLIER, supra note 6, S 3.01[2][b], at 3-59 to 3-62.
15. 28 U.S.C. S 1471, discussed at supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
16. 1 COLLIER, supra note 6, S 3.01[1][d][i], at 3-36.
17. 28 U.S.C. S 151.
18. See 1 COLLIER, supra note 6, S 3.01[1][d][i], at 3-36 to 3-38.
19. Northern was joined in the Supreme Court by the United States, which had
intervened to defend the statute. 102 S. Ct. at 2846.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, gives to Congress the power'to establish ... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
21. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 11, at 29-38 (3d ed. 1976).




First, the plurality held that the cases upholding limited tenure for
territorial and District of Columbia courts 3 were based on the com-
plete sovereign power of the federal government in those jurisdic-
tions, unshared with any state authorities. Although this power derives
to some extent from article I of the Constitution, as does the
bankruptcy power of Congress, the federal authority in these ter-
ritories is of a special plenary nature, unlike other questions over
which Congress has power to legislate by virtue of article I.25
In addition, Northern Pipeline relied on a series of cases26 in which
the Supreme Court had upheld congressional authority to create
nontenured courts-martial. The plurality limited these cases to the
exercise of the military authority of the federal government, which
was conferred on the political branches of the government-the ex-
ecutive and the legislative-and was not limited by the separation
of powers structure of the Constitution, as were other powers given
to Congress where an independent judiciary was important.27 Finally,
the plurality addressed those cases most likely to sustain the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts, those sustaining jurisdiction of ad-
ministrative agencies and nontenured judges of the Court of Customs.
These cases were probably the most analogous to a case involving
the bankruptcy courts because they involved courts based on the con-
gressional power to legislate under article I. The plurality opinion
in Northern Pipeline ittempted to distinguish these cases as based
on a "public rights" exception to the article III judicial power, which
appears to recognize that some matters traditionally are entrusted
by the Constitution to the political branches of government-the
legislative and the executive-and are not within the protection of
the separation of powers doctrine. In the plurality's language:
The doctrine extends only to matters arising "between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with
the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
or legislative departments," .... and only to matters that historical-
ly could have been determined exclusively by those departments.
• . . The understanding of these cases is that the Framers ex-
23. The principle cases are American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)
(territories) and Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (District of Columbia).
24. The District of Columbia jurisdiction is an article I power, while the power
over territories seems to derive exclusively from article IV, section 3 of the Constitu-
tion. The difference does not seem to be significant to the power of Congress to create
"legislative courts" to exercise part of its sovereign power.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 2868.
26. Principally, Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) and Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953).
27. 102 S. Ct. at 2868-9.
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pected that Congress would be free to commit such matters com-
pletely to non-judicial executive determination, and that as a result
there can be no constitutional objection to Congress employing
the less drastic expedient of committing their determination to
a legislative court or administrative agency. 8
Although the plurality refused to draw the line of distinction between
public and private rights, it said a public right requires at "a minimum"
a contest between an individual and the government and would never
extend to contests between two private parties.' In addition, suits
in which the government is a party still would not be within the public
rights category if the action otherwise was within the judicial
cognizance at common law.30 Thus, the presence of the United States
as a party is "a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing
'private rights' from 'public rights.'-"1 Finally, while it would seem
that an independent judiciary is most needed when the action is be-
tween the sovereign and one of its citizens, the Court rejected this
argument and held that the "public rights" doctrine is not based on
need (or in the plurality's language, "political theory"), but rather on
what was reserved to the judicial branch "as a matter of historical
fact."32
Having thus limited the previous exceptions to article III of the
Constitution, the plurality easily concluded that the claim involved
in Northern Pipeline did not qualify for special treatment. Although
the plurality conceded that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor rela-
tions, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such
as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case,"
it concluded that "the former may well be a 'public right,' but the
latter is obviously not."' Since Northern's claim was defined by the
state law of contract and was unchanged by the mere filing of a
bankruptcy petition by the plaintiff,' the plurality believed it was
within the class of cases cognizable at common law.
The second attempt to sustain the bankruptcy jurisdiction was
based on an argument that the courts were merely adjuncts of district
courts, which are article III courts. This argument was based prin-
cipally on two earlier decisions of the Court, Crowell v. Benson," and
28. Id. at 2869-70.
29. Id. at 2870-71.
30. Id. at 2870-71 n.23.
31. Id. at 2870-71 n.23.
32. Id. at 2870 n.20.
33. Id. at 2871.
34. See note 4, supra.
35. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (sustaining the creation of an administrative tribunal to
1982]
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United States v. Raddatz." The plurality in Northern Pipeline read
these cases as establishing two narrow exceptions to the article III
scheme. First, where rights are created by Congress, that body should
have "substantial discretion" to determine how such rights are
adjudicated. 7 Second, where the rights involved are not of congres-
sional creation, such as constitutional rights or claims cognizable at
common law, certain fact-finding still could be delegated to an adjunct
of the article III court, such as a federal magistrate, as long as he
was "subject to sufficient controls by an article III district court.""
These two controls were satisfied, according to the plurality, in
both Crowell and Raddatz. In Crowell, involving the adjudication of
a congressionally created right, the agency was delegated only limited
fact-finding authority and those facts were subject to a limited review
in the district court, akin to the review of facts found by a jury; ques-
tions of law were determined solely by the court, and only the court
could enforce awards. 9 In Raddatz, involving the delegation of some
authority over constitutionally created rights, the magistrates were
appointed and removable by district judges, they heard only particular
issues referred by the district court, and findings of facts were sub-
ject to a de novo review, including the power to adduce additional
evidence."0
In contrast, the delegation to bankruptcy judges was neither
limited, as in Crowell, or capable of direct control by the district court,
as in Raddatz. The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act created a mandatory
delegation of all judicial functions to the bankruptcy courts;" they
were given authority to hear all matters arising under, in, or related
to bankruptcy cases, not merely some specialized species of issues,
as was given to certain administrative agencies. In addition, although
prior to the 1978 Act, bankruptcy referees, like magistrates, were
appointed and removable by the district court, the 1978 Act made
bankruptcy judges appointable (and removable) by the President. Fur-
thermore, orders of a bankruptcy judge, in some situations, were
make factual determinations concerning the eligibility for compensation under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
36. 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (upholding the 1978 Federal Magistrates Act, which
delegated certain authority to U.S. Magistrates not protected by article III).
37. 102 S. Ct. at 2876. This apparently would not include a right to completely
delegate the adjudicatory function. The plurality emphasized the authority to delegate
"some" functions and pointed to Crowell's use of the term "specialized" functions. It
refused to define the limits of Congress's power to delegate. Id. at 2876 n.32.
38. Id. at 2875.
39. 225 U.S. at 51-65.
40. 447 U.S. at 673-74.
41. 28 U.S.C. S 151 (Supp. 11 1978).
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reviewable by the district courts only by appeal."2 This is a true ap-
pellate jurisdiction, not the kind of close supervision that exists with
magistrates. Finally, the bankruptcy courts also received the power
to enforce their own judgments. Thus, the "essential attributes of
judicial power" were not reserved to article III courts as in both
Crowell and Raddatz.43
If bankruptcy courts as constituted by the 1978 Act do not pass
constitutional muster under these standards, how can they be
reconstituted? Congress obviously could constitute them as full fled-
ged article III courts, as contemplated originally by the House of
Representatives," and eliminate all problems. This is the approach
taken in H.R. 6978, reported to the House by the Judiciary Commit-
tee, and supported by most, of the witnesses to date before that
committee.4 ' Two other approaches are also possible. The first is to
make the bankruptcy courts true adjuncts of the district courts, essen-
tially functioning as federal magistrates. Thus they presumably would
be referred most bankruptcy matters, but in order to have an article
III court retain the "essential attributes of judicial power," all deci-
sions on questions of fact would probably be reviewed de novo by the
district court. Further, the district court would retain complete con-
trol over questions of law and directly issue whatever enforcement
orders would result from bankruptcy proceedings.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it will place
an extraordinary strain on the district courts and continue one of the
problems the Bankruptcy Reform Act was designed to eliminate, the
participation of already busy federal courts in much of the routine
business of bankruptcy. Second, this approach assumes that many of
the incidental actions, i.e., those based on state law but "related to"
bankruptcy cases,46 are within the federal judicial power in the first
place. Chief Justice Burger assumed as much when he suggested in
his dissent that these are the only cases which the bankruptcy court
cannot hear, and these can be routinely routed to the regular docket
of the district court.47 If the case is one sounding only in state law,
42. An appeal to the district court exists only in some cases, while other cases
are appealable immediately to a bankruptcy appellate panel. Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1978, S 201(2), 28 U.S.C. S 160.
43. In addition, bankruptcy courts were given nationwide venue and jurisdiction,
see 102 S. Ct. at 2863 n.4, which is much more expansive than even article III courts
in most cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
44. See supra note 12 and accompanying. text.
45. H.R. 6978, 9th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. H5884 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1982);
see also S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. S431 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1982).
See generally News and Comments, BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) A75 (July 23, 1982).
46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 2882.
19821
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as in Northern Pipeline, it is questionable how the mere existence
of a trustee or bankruptcy debtor as a party can otherwise bring the
case within the federal judicial power. The pre-1978 bankruptcy law
was not entirely clear on this question. The statute itself did not grant
federal courts general subject matter jurisdiction over all such cases.
Federal jurisdiction over such incidental actions was limited to cases
in which the actions could have been brought in federal court between
the debtor and the adverse party had no bankruptcy intervened, cases
in which the adverse party consented to jurisdiction in the federal
court, or cases in which the trustee's claim arose from the bankrupt-
cy statute itself. 8
Where the claim was not based on a federal right or on diversity
of citizenship, the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts would be
very questionable. In the infrequent cases where the issue had arisen,
the Supreme Court had sanctioned jurisdiction either on the theory
that a bankruptcy trustee was a party or because the claim arose
in the course of bankruptcy."9 These reasons do not seem sufficient
since neither rationale is supported by the literal language of the ar-
ticle III judicial power. The United States is not a party, and although
the trustee is appointed by the court, he represents the debtor's estate
and in no sense acts for the United States; nor does the claim in any
sense arise under federal law, except in the sense that the trustee
is given his status by the federal bankruptcy act.' Although this poses
a particularly troublesome question for those who would constitute
bankruptcy courts as adjuncts of article III courts, this issue may be
beyond debate. Even the plurality concedes that these issues may be
litigated in federal court because of "their relationship to the
petition,"51 despite the minor impediment of the language of article III.
The other possible approach is to constitute bankruptcy courts
as article I courts, allowing them to adjudicate those claims which
are within the "public rights" exception announced in Northern
Pipeline and sending all other claims to district courts. This is the
approach suggested by Chief Justice Burger, and he assumes the only
claims not within the exception would be the kind involved in North-
ern Pipeline, i.e., a claim based on state law.52 The plurality even leaves
room for this approach by suggesting that Congress might choose to
48. The trustee's avoidance power was under sections 60, 67, and 70 of the old
statute. See Bankruptcy Act S 23(b), 30 Stat. 544, 552, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
49. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367
(1934).
50. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 2872 n.26.
52. Id. at 2882.
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reenact a broad bankruptcy court jurisdiction provision, taking the
chance that on a case-by-case basis courts will deny the bankruptcy
courts power since the particular issue is not within the "public rights"
exception.'
If Congress took this approach, it is not clear what could be done
by bankruptcy courts as independent article I courts. The plurality
suggested that issues relating to "the restructuring of the debtor-
creditor relationship" might be within the "public rights" exception,
but it did not suggest how far such power might extend.5 For exam-
ple, does the power extend only to the question of whether the debt-
or is entitled to invoke bankruptcy, i.e., may he be a "debtor" under
section 109 of the Act? Since this right alone is meaningless, merely
allowing a debtor to use the bankruptcy proceeding to distribute his
assets, would the power extend also to granting the debtor a
discharge? If so, doesn't this affect the common law claims of a creditor
and fail to satisfy even the "minimum" test that the claim be between
the government and one of its citizens.! Furthermore, this issue
typically is one between two private parties, the debtor and the
creditor.
Short of creating full-fledged article III courts or getting district
courts very deeply into bankruptcy administration, the plurality opin-
ion may leave little room for Congress to maneuver. Since two of
the votes necessary to constitute a majority, those of Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor, would have invalidated only the power of
bankruptcy courts to hear state law claims, Congress may choose to
read their concurrences narrowly and attempt to preserve as much
of the present bankruptcy jurisdiction as possible.
Before Congress acts, however, bankruptcy practioners are in lim-
bo about how to proceed on even the simplest bankruptcy matter-
where to file the petition. Even though the plurality contemplated
that at least some routine matters could be performed by bankruptcy
courts, it held that the grant of jurisdiction in section 1471(c)' was
not severable, and the whole grant of power was stricken. When on
53. Id. at 2880 n.40.
54. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
56. The general grant of jurisdiction to district courts and through them to the
bankruptcy courts is contained in section 241(a) of the Act, amending 28 U.S.C. S 1471.
Although the Court speaks of all of 241(a) as being invalid, it obviously invalidated
only that part of 241(a) which conferred jurisdictional authority on the bankruptcy
courts, 28 U.S.C. S 1471(c). The rest of section 241(a), relating both to jurisdiction of
the district courts and to other matters, such as venue, removal, and appeals, was




December 24 the Court's self-imposed stay of its mandate is lifted57
(and until Congress acts), how will bankruptcy matters proceed?
Assuming Williams v. Austrian5" and Schumacher v. Beeler59 are still
good law, district courts still have jurisdiction to hear all bankruptcy
matters, both questions of pure bankruptcy administration, i.e., right
to relief and entitlement to discharge, and incidental plenary actions,
even those based on state law.6" Thus, all bankruptcy proceedings
should be administrable by the district courts and all proceedings
should be initiated there.6'
Once a case is commenced in the district court there would ap-
pear to be no impediment to the Court referring large matters of
administration to the existing bankruptcy judges as special masters
under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 In such event,
a reference would appear to be permissible under the standards of
United States v. Raddatz, with the district court retaining supervi-
sion over the activities of the bankruptcy judge-master. At least un-
til Congress acts, this may be the only way for the bankruptcy
machinery to continue to operate.
UNIFORM BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
The Supreme Court this year also addressed a question which
has arisen very infrequently in bankruptcy litigation, the meaning of
the uniformity requirement under the congressional power to enact
"Uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies."63 The issue arose in
Railway Labor Executives Association v. Gibbons," which grew out of
the bankruptcy of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany (Rock Island). Rock Island originally had filed a petition for
reorganization under the 1898 bankruptcy statute, and it continued
in operation until a labor strike in 1979. Soon after this, the district
court in which the reorganization petition was pending determined
that reorganization was not possible and ordered the railroad to
57. The Court originally stayed its mandate until October 4, 1982. 102 S. Ct. at
2880. The stay was extended upon motion of the Justice Department until December
24, 1982. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
58. 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
59. 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
60. 28 U.S.C. S 1471(a),(b).
61. Indeed, the bankruptcy case must be filed in the district court since this jurisdic-
tion is exclusive. 28 U.S.C. S 1471(a). In contrast, the district court's jurisdiction over
matters arising in, or related to, a bankruptcy proceeding is merely concurrent. 28
U.S.C. S 1471(b).
62. But see LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (criticizing a federal
court for such a liberal, routine use of the reference power of rule 53).
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8.
64. 455 U.S. 457, 102 S. Ct. 1169 (1982).
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liquidate. Because the outstanding liabilities to the employees of Rock
Island would not be paid in full upon liquidation," Congress enacted
the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act
(RITA),6 which required payment from the Rock Island estate of up
to $75 million in benefits to employees of the railroad not hired by
other carriers. It required this money to be treated as an ad-
ministrative expense for determining priority, 7 which meant that the
employees would be paid before any other creditors.6"
The statute was attacked by other creditors of Rock Island on
several grounds, including that a statute directed at a specific debtor
was not a "uniform" bankruptcy law and therefore was beyond Con-
gress's bankruptcy power.69 The Supreme Court agreed. It classified
RITA as nothing more than a "private bill" not permitted under the
congressional bankruptcy authority:
The conclusion is thus inevitable that RITA is not a response
either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies
or to any geographically isolated problem: it is a response to the
problems caused by the bankruptcy of one railroad. The employee
protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class of debt-
ors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular problem
of one bankrupt railroad.
7
1
The Court was careful to distinguish RITA from other "nonuniform"
bankruptcy legislation that might be permissible. For example, it sug-
gested that Congress could enact legislation that would affect only
one industry "as a distinctive and special problem 71 and could "fashion
legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems."" However,
RITA did not purport to address a specific regional problem or to
treat all members of a particular industry equally. 3
65. The 1898 Act did extend some protection to employees' claims for wages by
giving them a second priority on the assets of the debtor (after administrative ex-
penses) but only to the extent of $600 per claimant and even then only for wages
earned within 90. days of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act S 64, 30 Stat. 544, 563, repealed
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
66. 45 U.S.C. SS 1001-1018 (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 102 S. Ct. at 1175.
68. Bankruptcy Act S 64 (repealed 1978).
69. Another argument advanced by the creditors was that the assets of Rock Island,
the $75 million, were taken for a public purpose, i.e., to partially alleviate unemploy-
ment among railroad workers, and that this taking was without compensation. 102
S. Ct. at 1174.
70. Id. at 1177.
71. Id. at 1176.
72. Id. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (the 3R
Act Cases).
73. None of the other railroads in bankruptcy at the time RITA was passed received
1982]
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The Court's decision in Gibbons is probably not of great
significance either to general bankruptcy administration or to the
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation. The opinion makes
clear that some "nonuniform" legislation will be upheld if it is generally
applicable either to a particular industry or geographical area;
however, Congress cannot enact "private bills" for particular debtors
under its bankruptcy authority.74
VALIDITY OF VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE
The Fifth Circuit this year again addressed a question which has
remained troublesome both to sellers of movables and bankruptcy
trustees alike, the validity of the Louisiana vendor's privilege against
a trustee's claim as a bona fide purchaser. Section 545 of the Bankrupt-
cy Act of 1978, like its predecessor, section 67(c) of the 1898 Act, in-
validates "statutory liens" which are not "perfected or enforceable
on the date of the filing of the petition against a bona fide purchaser
that purchases such property on the date of the filing of the petition.17
The Louisiana vendor's privilege is created by Civil Code article 3227:
"He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid
for, has a preference on the price of his property, over the other
creditors of the purchaser . . . if the property still remains in the
possession of the purchaser."
The Fifth Circuit, in In re Tape City, U.S.A., Inc.,"6 sustained the
seller's privilege against the trustee's claim that it was invalidated
by section 545 of the Bankruptcy Act. In so doing the court did not
write on a totally clean slate. The court's opinion in Tape City simply
affirms without serious discussion the earlier decision of the court
in In re Trahan," which interpreted similar language in section 67(c)
of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The district .court in Trahan held that
a vendor's privilege is perfected and enforceable against a bona fide
purchaser, unless that purchaser also takes possession of the item.
Thus, the language of old section 67, now section 545, does not in-
validate the vendor's privilege.
the benefit of the legislation. They were administered under the general bankruptcy
statute. See 102 S. Ct. at 1177 n.11.
74. Justices Brennan and Marshall would allow a "private bill" upon proof that
the legislation serves a "national interest apart from the economic interest of that
debtor or class, and if the identified national interest justifies Congress' failure to
apply the law to other debtors." Id. at 1179 (Marshall, J., concurring).
75. 11 U.S.C. S 545(2) (Supp. 11 1978). A statutory lien is a lien arising "solely
by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions." 11 U.S.C. S 101(38)
(Supp. 11 1978).
76. 677 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968), afftd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Since Trahan addressed the same question that was before the
court in Tape City, it would have been predictable for the court to
follow its prior decision except for the fact that Trahan was merely
a per curiam affirmance and an intervening decision by the First Cir-
cuit, in In re Nieves & Co.,"8 squarely faced the same question under
the Puerto Rico Civil Code's vendor's privilege and decided the ques-
tion in favor of the bankruptcy trustee. As under Louisiana Civil Code
article 3227, the Puerto Rico Civil Code gives a seller of movables
a privilege for the purchase price while the purchaser remains in
possession of the thing.7" Rather than looking at the bare language
of section 545, which does not expressly give the trustee the status
of a purchaser with possession, the First Circuit interpreted the policy
behind the lien invalidation provision of section 67(c) (now section 545).
The First Circuit stated: "This provision strikes at a lien which is so
tenuous that it can be defeated by transfer to a bona fide purchaser.
The holders of such liens have reason to know that their security
is extremely vulnerable." ' This position was also consistent with the
apparent reasons for the 1966 amendments to the statutory lien pro-
vision of the old statute:
Notwithstanding the long established bankruptcy principle that
valid liens should be enforceable in their entirety as against
general, unsecured creditors and those entitled to priority, the
realization developed that state-created statutory liens run counter
to the underlying objective of equitable distribution of the debtor's
assets among all his creditors."
For the First Circuit, this policy was important since the language
of the bankruptcy statute did not provide a clear answer to the ques-
tion. For example, did the statute mean that a trustee may invalidate
the privilege only if all bona fide purchasers may do so or that a
trustee may invalidate the privilege if any bona fide purchaser may
do so? The First Circuit held that when Congress spoke of giving
the trustee the "rights of a hypothetical purchaser, it contemplated
a full-blooded, not an anemic, purchaser."82 That is, for the purpose
of measuring the trustee's power under section 545, it must be assum-
ed that the trustee both purchases and takes possession of the item.
78. 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971). This position was followed by a Louisiana bankrupt-
cy judge in In re Hughes, 9 Bankr. 251 (W.D. La. 1981). See also, Comment, Statutory
Liens Under Section 67c of the Bankruptcy Act: Some Problems of Definition, 43 TUL.
L. REV. 305 (1969).
79. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, S 5192 (2d ed. 1968).
80. 446 F.2d at 191 (citing S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2456, 2461).
81. 4 COLLIER, supra note 6, S 545.03(1) (emphasis added).
82. 446 F.2d at 192.
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This is especially true in the case of a debtor who remains in posses-
sion of his estate following the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."
In these circumstances the debtor has the status of a bona fide pur-
chaser under section 545 and in fact has possession of the item sub-
ject to the vendor's prhiilege.
Even the Nieves position, however, is not compelled, although it
seems to address the real issue more correctly than those who sup-
port the vendor's privilege. Two commentators have supported the
privilege largely on the distinction between the common law lien as
a charge against property and the civilian privilege as growing out
of the nature of the debt. 4 This seems to miss the point. As a matter
of federal supremacy, Congress could invalidate the vendor's privilege
by express language, whether the interest is like a lien or something
else. That it has not done so expressly only begins the inquiry, which
should be resolved by bankruptcy policy. That is, if Congress had
thought about the possession requirement, how would it have treated
the privilege? Congress, for example, has chosen to enforce state con-
sensual liens in bankruptcy.15 Since Louisiana could make its vendor's
privilege enforceable in bankruptcy by requiring a voluntary grant
of the privilege by the purchasers to the seller, as for a chattel mort-
gage, rather than arising automatically, perhaps the only reason the
statutory lien should be treated differently is because it is not bargained
for by the seller and not relied upon in extending credit to the
debtor, as is a conventional chattel mortgage. Thus, the reason for
recognizing the consensual lien-to facilitate commerce and encourage
the extension of credit 8 -does not exist in the case of a vendor's
privilege, because by definition the seller has not bargained for the
privilege and presumably would have extended credit in any event.87
83. Unlike Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Act (liquidations), in a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Act, a trustee is not automatically appointed.
The debtor remains in possession of his business. 11 U.S.C. S 1104. In such case the
debtor is given all of the powers and risks a trustee would have had, 11 U.S.C. S
1107, including the trustee's rights under section 545. 5 COLLIER, supra note 6, 5
1107.03(2). See Tape City, 677 F.2d at 403 n.7.
84. See Rubin & Rubin, The Louisiana Vendor's Privilege on Movables: A Secured
Claim Valid Against A Bankruptcy Trustee, 29 LA. B.J. 61 (1981).
85. Unlike the statutory lien, the consensual lien (i.e., security interest), like a
chattel mortgage, is created by agreement rather than by operation of law, even if
the right to so agree is created by statute. 11 U.S.C. S 101(38). These liens-are generally
enforceable in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. S 725, although the trustee does succeed to
whatever rights the debtor may have to invalidate such agreements, 11 U.S.C. S 541.
86. See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, TEACHING NOTES FOR COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 11 (3d ed. 1981).
87. Of course, the Louisiana vendor's privilege can be seen as the state's attempt
to allocate the burden of bargaining in favor of the seller. That is, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, the seller gets the privilege, a scheme at least as
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In these circumstances, the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribu-
tion to all creditors should outweigh the state's interest in favoring
a particular creditor.
In Louisiana, however, unlike states that have adopted article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the vendor's privilege may
serve some additional purpose, and although given solely by statute,
it in fact may have been part of the bargain between the original
vendor and the bankrupt. Unlike article 9 of the U.C.C., a subsequent
lender under the Louisiana Chattel Mortgage Act" must stand in line
behind a previous lender who has taken a chattel mortgage in the
debtor's after acquired property.89 Thus, unlike jurisdictions having
adopted article 9 of the U.C.C.," in Louisiana it would be impossible
for a subsequent lender to take first priority, even as to property
as to which he furnishes the purchase price," but for the vendor's
privilege, which gives him first rank as to such property.2 In the
absence of such a device, the original lender who has taken a securi-
ty interest in after acquired property has a lock on the debtor's
business, since he is in a position to refuse future advances, and the
debtor cannot turn elsewhere, since he cannot assure the subsequent
lenders a good first priority in such security. In this instance, the
vendor's privilege does in Louisiana what the purchase money securi-
ty interest does in all other jurisdictions, and at least where a lender
has relied on this device to defeat a senior chattel mortgage in after
acquired property, it would appear the subsequent lender has a good
claim to this form of security. It does promote the extension of credit
in the same manner as the consensual chattel mortgage, where the
credit would not be given but for the priority obtainable by the ven-
dor's privilege.
However this question is ultimately decided, the two policies iden-
tified above, the policy of equitable distribution to all creditors and
defensible as the contrary presumption, i.e., no security if no agreement. Even if this
were so, the federal bankruptcy act has generally prohibited such a presumption, by
denying enforceability of a security interest unless affirmatively granted by the deb-
tor. See 11 U.S.C. SS 101(37) & 725.
88. LA. R.S. 9:5351-5366 (1950).
89. This is so by virtue of Civil Code article 3329 and LA. R.S. 9:5354 (Supp. 1978)
(of the Chattel Mortgage Act), which rank mortgages in the order in which they are
filed. A mortgage in after acquired property is possible by virtue of LA. R.S. 9:5352
(Supp. 1981).
90. The U.C.C. gives a subsequent security interest first priority where the lender
advanced the purchase price for the item subject to the security interest. U.C.C. S
9-312(3) & (4) (1977).
91. Under the U.C.C. this would be a purchase money security interest. See U.S.C.
S 9-107 (1977).
92. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3227.
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the policy of enforcing bargained for security as a means of encourag-
ing the extension of credit, seem to be more relevant to the inquiry
than interpretational gymnastics about whether a purchaser should
'be presumed to have possession or whether there is some technical
difference between a privilege and a common law lien. Where a
creditor in Louisiana has relied on the position given him by the ven-
dor's privilege in the manner that a purchase money security interest
protects creditors in other states, it seems reasonable to protect that
interest in bankruptcy. Where a seller gets such protection without
asking for it, the bankruptcy trustee would appear to have a better
claim. The problem with the Louisiana vendor's privilege is that it
paints with too broad a brush, attempting to protect sellers in both
categories. Whether bankruptcy courts can distinguish between these
classes of creditors under the current wording of section 545 of the
Bankruptcy Code and article 3227 of the Louisiana Civil Code, or do
so without time-consuming factual inquiries, are additional questions.
The clearest route would be for the vendor's privilege to be held unen-
forceable in its present form, requiring the legislature to provide a
more narrow device for protecting the purchase money lender who
does rely on such a right.
The results in Trahan and Tape City, therefore, may be correct
but for the wrong reason. The panels in both cases failed to identify
the correct competing policies and at least should have given more
plenary consideration to the issues raised by those cases. Ultimately,
this issue may have to be addressed by the Supreme Court or by
Congress.
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